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INTRODUCTION 
Apparently dissatisfied with the State Engineer's Order granting only a fixed time 
approval of its Application to Appropriate Water, TWW filed a petition for judicial 
review of the State Engineer's Order, thereby initiating a trial de novo in which all 
proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP"). This opened 
the door to Roy City's intervention pursuant to Rule 24 of the URCP. Utah law does not 
allow TWW or the State Engineer to now close that door on permitted entrants and issues 
that may be unfavorable to TWW. 
In its brief in opposition, TWW argues that Roy City may not intervene in the 
district court's judicial review of the State Engineer's Order on three erroneous grounds: 
(1) Roy City lacks standing to intervene because it was not a party to the administrative 
proceeding, (2) the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") prohibits intervention 
in a proceeding for judicial review, and (3) Roy City failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies and participate in the administrative proceeding by not filing a timely protest. 
Additionally, TWW asserts that, even if Rule 24 governs Roy City's intervention, Roy 
City's application for intervention is untimely and would result in prejudice to TWW, and 
thus does not meet the requirements of Rule 24 for intervention. The State Engineer, on 
the other hand, argues in its brief that Roy City's intervention should be denied based on 
policy considerations to protect the State Engineer's role and process of administering 
water rights in Utah. 
However, as will be explained below, Utah law allows Roy City to intervene in the 
judicial review proceeding. First, intervenors such as Roy City need not establish 
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"standing" to intervene in a district court's judicial review of a State Engineer decision 
beyond meeting the requirements of Rule 24. Second, all proceedings in the judicial 
review are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows intervention 
under Rule 24. Third, although Roy City need not exhaust administrative remedies 
because it did not file the petition to seek or commence judicial review, it nevertheless 
participated sufficiently at the administrative level by raising its issues before the State 
Engineer long before issuance of the Order, now on review before the district court. 
Finally, Roy City's intervention in the de novo review is timely and will not prejudice 
TWW—Roy City may not and will not raise new issues. See Brooklyn Canal Co. v. 
Badger, 922 P.2d 745 (Utah 1996). 
It will also be shown that the State Engineer's policy arguments, first raised on 
appeal, ignore the plain and unambiguous language and operation of Utah statutes and 
court rules, which statutes and rules in any event address the concerns raised by the State 
Engineer. Accordingly, Roy City respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district 
court's denial of Roy City's motion to intervene and allow Roy City to intervene pursuant 
to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
1. ROY CITY NEED NOT ESTABLISH STANDING BEYOND THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Under Utah law an intervenor, such as Roy City, need not establish its own 
independent standing, other than meeting the standing requirements of Rule 24. 
Nevertheless, the district court denied Roy City's Motion to Intervene on the grounds that 
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Roy City "has no standing or right to participate in this proceeding for judicial review." 
(R. 234, 257:33-34.) Likewise, TWW adopts this analysis, arguing that Roy City may 
not intervene because "Roy City lacks standing before the district court." (TWW Brief, 
at 20.) Because the district court and TWW premise their denial of and opposition to 
Roy City's intervention on a faulty application of Utah's standing requirements, we begin 
with a discussion of Utah's standing law. 
A. Standing to Intervene is Determined Solely by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Utah's jurisprudence has recognized a variety of different types of "standing" 
necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of different courts and adjudicative bodies: 
constitutional standing, see, e.g., Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), and its 
corollary standing to seek judicial review of an infonnal agency action (e.g. decisions of 
the State Engineer), see, e.g., Washington County Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 
58, 82 P.3d 1125; standing to seek appellate judicial review of formal agency actions, see 
In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, 175 P.3d 545; appellate standing (i.e. standing to 
appeal district court orders to appellate courts), see Socfy of Prof I Journalists, Utah 
Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 1987) (holding that an appellant has 
standing to appeal if it (1) "had standing under the traditional test in the original 
proceeding before the district court," (2) "was a party or privy to the action below," and 
(3) "is aggrieved by that court's judgment"); standing to intervene and participate in 
formal administrative proceedings, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 
UT 74, 148 P.3d 960; and even standing to intervene in district court proceedings, see, 
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e.g., In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, 137 P.3d 809. While there is much overlap in the principles 
and requirements for different types of standing, they nevertheless have discrete 
differences, thus requiring application of the correct type of standing analysis for the type 
of proceeding at issue. 
Neither the district court nor TWW explains or identifies which type of standing 
should apply, and by Roy City allegedly failing to have such standing, which serves as 
the basis for their denial of and opposition to Roy City's intervention in the judicial 
review. Nevertheless, a review of the district court's and TWW's analyses reveals that 
they have confused and incorrectly applied the standing requirements to seek judicial 
review of State Engineer decisions instead of the requirements for standing to intervene. 
TWW has argued that, "in order to be allowed to intervene, before the Court even 
looks at Rule 24, Roy must demonstrate that it has standing to intervene." (TWW Brief, 
at 13.) TWW thus argues that Roy City's "[sjtanding is determined under the 
Administrative Procedure Act," and that standing under UAPA requires an intervenor to 
be a "party" to the administrative proceeding. (TWW Brief, at 13, 19-20.) Thus, the 
argument goes, Roy City lacked standing to intervene in the district court proceeding 
because Roy City was not a "party" to the administrative proceeding under UAPA. {Id. 
at 20.) Likewise, the district court did not look at or analyze Roy City's compliance with 
Rule 24 requirements, but rather simply held that Roy City lacked standing because it did 
not file a timely protest in the administrative proceeding. (R. 236.) 
As will be explained in more detail below, standing to intervene is determined 
solely by meeting the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
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In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, [^51 ("Intervention is the act by which a third party obtains 
standing to become a party in a suit."); see also San Juan County v. U.S., 503 F.3d 1163, 
1171 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that parties seeking to intervene under Rule 24 need not 
establish constitutional standing so long as another party with standing on the same side 
as the intervenor remains in the case). 
1. Constitutional Standing 
The standing requirement as first applied in American courts has its basis in 
Article III of the United States Constitution, which "limits the jurisdiction of federal 
courts to Cases and Controversies." See San Juan County v. U.S., 503 F.3d 1163, 1171 
(10th Cir. 2007) (citing U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2). To limit the disputes that the federal 
courts hear to "cases" and "controversies," the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff 
must establish standing—"namely, the plaintiff must (1) have suffered an injury in fact 
(2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and (3) that is likely to be redressed 
by a favorable decision." Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997)). 
The standing requirement as developed under Utah common law, which requires 
"the moving party [to] have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court," see Jenkins, 
675 P.2d at 1148, has a slightly different genesis: "Unlike federal law where standing 
doctrine is related to the 'case5 or 'controversy' language of Article III of the United 
States Constitution, our standing law arises from the general precepts of the doctrine of 
separation of powers found in Article V of the Utah Constitution." Terracor v. Utah Bd. 
of State lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986); see also Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 
1149 (noting the distinction between origins of federal standing requirement and Utah's 
4850-1386-8803/RO042-003 < 
standing requirement). Under Utah's tripartite constitutional separation of powers, it is 
inherent "that particular disputes are most amenable to resolution in particular forums." 
See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1149. Therefore, "[t]he requirement that a plaintiff have a 
personal stake in the outcome of a dispute is intended to confine the courts to a role 
consistent with the separation of powers, and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts to 
those disputes which are most efficiently and effectively resolved through the judicial 
process." Id. 
Although having slightly different origins, both the federal standing requirement 
and Utah's constitutional standing requirements have the same objective: to confine the 
courts to hearing only those disputes decreed by the United States and Utah constitutions 
as the proper function of their respective judiciaries. 
2. Standing to Seek Judicial Review. 
Standing to seek judicial review of informal administrative actions, including an 
Order of the State Engineer, is a corollary of constitutional standing required to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court. Such judicial review is by trial de novo in district court. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-402(l)(a). Although Utah Code section 73-3-15 requires that 
a person seeking judicial review must be "aggrieved," see Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1989), Utah courts have held that "aggrieved" has the same meaning as the 
"traditional test" for constitutional standing requiring a distinct and particularized injury, 
see, e.g., Brown v. Division of Water Rights, 2008 UT App 353, 1J195 P-3d 933 (finding 
that plaintiff who sought judicial review of State Engineer order did not satisfy the 
adverse effect element of the traditional test for standing); Washington County 
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Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ffi[14, 16> 8 2 P - 3 d 1 1 2 5 CCThe commonly 
understood meaning of the term 'aggrieved' is consistent with our traditional standing 
requirement that a plaintiff show particularized injury."). In other words, a person is 
"aggrieved" if he or she can meet the traditional test for constitutional standing.1 
In addition to the traditional test for standing, a person seeking judicial review of 
State Engineer decisions must also exhaust administrative remedies by participating in 
the preceding administrative proceeding and raising his or her issues before the State 
Engineer. See S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990); Brooklyn Canal 
Co. v. Badger, 922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1996). Second, a protestant seeking judicial 
review must have filed a timely protest. See Prisbrey v. Bloomington Water Co., 2003 
UT 56, 1J26, 82 P.3d 1119 (holding that plaintiff "lacked standing . . . to challenge the 
change application proceedings, having failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by 
filing a timely protest to the state engineer"); Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 2000 
UT 69, [^26, 9 P.3d 762 (holding that late protestant had standing to seek judicial review 
given that State Engineer's notice was defective and thus did not trigger running of the 
This Court recently explained the three-part inquiry to determine standing under 
the "traditional test": 
First, the party must assert that it has been or will be "adversely affected by 
the [challenged] actions." Second, the party must allege a causal 
relationship "between the injury to the party, the [challenged] actions and 
the relief requestd." Third, the relief requested must be "substantially 
likely to redress the injury claimed." 
See Brown v. Division of Water Rights, 2008 UT App 353, \1 (quoting Utah Chapter of 
the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, ^fl9, 148 P.3d 960 (alterations in 
original)). 
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protest period). The district court and TWW base their opposition to, and denial of, Roy 
City's intervention by applying the standing necessary to seek judicial review, a corollary 
of constitutional standing. 
3. "Standing" to Intervene. 
Given the purpose of both constitutional standing and its corollary, standing to 
seek judicial review, it naturally follows that once a case has been properly initiated by 
parties with standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, as TWW has done, it is 
unnecessary for intervening parties to independently establish their own standing to seek 
judicial review. Rather, as will be shown below, an applicant for intervention may join in 
an action if he or she meets the Rule 24 requirements. 
While the precise issue of whether an intervenor must establish his own standing 
in addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 24 has not been directly addressed by any 
Utah court, it was recently decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Juan 
County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc), vacating on other 
grounds 420 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2005). In San Juan County, the county brought a 
federal quiet-title action against the United States, the Department of Interior, and 
National Park Service. Several conservation groups subsequently applied to intervene in 
the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 24, but the district court denied their 
intervention. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial, holding that "prospective 
intervenors need not establish their own standing to sue or defend, in addition to meeting 
Rule 24fs requirements, before intervening." See San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1203. In 
a rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit affirmed this result and reasoning, adopting the 
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rule followed by a majority of federal circuit courts:" u[P]arties seeking to intervene 
under Rule 24(a) or (b) need not establish Article III standing 'so long as another party 
with constitutional standing on the same side as the intervenor remains in the case.' . . . In 
that circumstance the federal court has a Case or Controversy before it regardless of the 
standing of the intervenor." San Juan County, 503 F.3d at 1172 (citation omitted). The 
court thus examined the groups' applications to intervene solely under Rule 24, not under 
the constitutional standing requirement. Id, at 1187. 
Under the majority rule followed by the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits, and now the Tenth Circuit, an intervenor need only meet Rule 24's 
requirements, and need not establish its own standing to intervene. See United States v. 
Tennessee, 260 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[A]n intervenor need not have the same 
standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit.") (quotation omitted); Dillard v. Baldwin County 
Comm 'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2000) (u[W]e have held that a party seeking 
to intervene into an already existing justiciable controversy need not satisfy the 
requirements of standing as long as the parties have established standing before the 
court."); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e hold that Article III 
does not require intervenors to independently possess standing where the intervention is 
into a subsisting and continuing Article III case or controversy and the ultimate relief 
sought by the intervenors is also being sought by at least one subsisting party with 
standing to do so."); Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that a 
party does not need standing to intervene in existing litigation so long as another party on 
its side in the litigation remains in the case with Article III standing); United States 
Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that because there was 
already a case or controversy between the existing parties to litigation, "there was no 
need to impose the standing requirement upon the proposed intervenor"). 
Only the Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have held that an intervenor must 
establish its own standing. See Jones v. Prince George's County, 348 F.3d 1014, 1017 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[Prospective intervenors in this circuit must possess standing under 
Article III of the Constitution."); South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1023 (8th 
Cir. 2003) ("A party seeking to intervene must establish both that it has standing to 
complain and that the elements of Rule 24(a)(2) are met."), cert, denied, 541 U.S. 987 
(2004); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 
(7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Seventh Circuit requires any prospective intervenor to 
show it has Article III standing). 
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The Utah case of In re E.K, 2006 UT 36, 137 P.3d 809, while not directly 
addressing the issue, nevertheless gives useful direction regarding the relationship and 
differences between standing and intervention, and ultimately supports the rule in San 
Juan County. In this case, a mother who had relinquished her parental rights through a 
written stipulation with the adopting parents of her child sought to participate in the 
adoption hearing commenced by the adopting parents. The Supreme Court first noted 
that "[i]n order to determine who may appear before the court, we must look to the law of 
standing and, its procedural cousin, intervention. The doctrine of standing ensures that 
the court will have the benefit of truly adverse parties in resolving a case." Id. [^49. After 
explaining that "standing is available only to a person who has sustained some injury to 
her legal, personal, or property rights," id. (quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 
(Utah 1983)), the Court then pointed out the variations and relationship between standing 
and intervention: 
Intervention is the act by which a third party obtains standing to become 
a party in a suit. It has been described as a method by which an outsider 
with an interest in an action may enter and participate as a party. To justify 
intervention, the party seeking intervention must demonstrate a direct 
interest in the subject matter of the litigation such that the intervenor's 
rights may be affected, for good or for ill. . . . The requisite interest 
necessary to permit intervention may arise from the intervenor's status or 
her circumstances. Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which governs intervention as of right, describes the connection that must 
exist between a person's status or circumstances and the lawsuit in order 
to justify intervention^] 
Id. ^51 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Court thus analyzed the mother's 
"standing to intervene" in the adoption hearing within the context of Rule 24, and held 
that irrespective of the relinquishment of her parental rights, "the mother has made the 
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requisite showing for intervention under rule 24(a)." See id. ^{52, 57. Thus, the Court 
determined that the intervenor's right or qualification to participate in a judicial 
proceeding already commenced by another was determined solely by Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, not by both the standing requirements necessary to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court and also the requirements of Rule 24. 
As is evident in In re E.H. and San Juan County, once an action has been 
commenced by parties with the proper standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, as 
TWW did by filing a petition for judicial review, a third party's "standing to intervene" is 
determined solely in accordance with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Roy 
City, which is seeking only to intervene under Rule 24(a) or (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, thus need not establish standing apart from its right to intervene under 
Rule 24 so long as an original party with standing (e.g. TWW, Weber Basin or the State 
Engineer) remains in the case. In such circumstance, the district court has a case properly 
before it "regardless of the standing of the intervenor" Roy City. See San Juan County, 
503F.3datll72. 
B. In re Questar and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401 do not Support a 
Standing Requirement for Intervenors Other than Rule 24. 
TWW nevertheless asserts that "Roy must demonstrate that it has standing to 
intervene" by being a "party" to the underlying administrative proceeding. {See TWW 
Brief, at 13, 18-20.) As support for this contention, TWW relies solely on In re Questar 
Gas Co,, 2007 UT 79, 175 P.3d 545, and Utah Code Ann. section 63G-4-401, neither of 
which supports TWW's position. 
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In Questar, two consumers sought to intervene in a formal adjudicative proceeding 
before the Utah Public Service Commission ("Commission") to challenge the existing 
parties' settlement stipulation. Their request to intervene was denied by the Commission 
because it was filed only after a long and complicated fomial administrative process that 
resulted in a stipulated settlement among several parties. See id. ^[18-19. The 
consumers then filed petitions with the Utah Supreme Court for appellate judicial review. 
This Court first affirmed the Commission's order denying intervention for failure 
to meet the requirements for intervention in a formal administrative proceeding.3 Id. ^|33. 
Having affirmed the denial of intervention, this Court then focused on whether any of the 
petitioners had "appellate standing that would grant [the Supreme Court] subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear their appeal."4 Id. |^44 (emphasis added). This Court did not, 
however, deny intervention in the administrative proceeding on any alleged lack of 
"standing to intervene." Questar does not stand for the proposition that "in order to be 
This Court affirmed the Commission's order denying intervention because it found 
that the consumers' intervention did not meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 63-46b-9(2), which allows intervention in formal administrative proceedings, 
because intervention at a late stage "will materially impair the interests of justice and the 
orderly and prompt conduct of the Commission proceedings." 2007 UT 79, ffi[33. By the 
time of the consumers' request to intervene, the existing parties had already entered into a 
settlement agreement, "undertook much work at great expense," had "engaged in 
vigorous negotiations and retained independent experts to make assessments of the best 
alternatives," and Questar had "provided lengthy testimony and responded to over four 
hundred discovery requests made by Consumer Services and the Division that comprised 
over one thousand pages." Id. 
4
 Appeal or judicial review of formal administrative proceedings is an appeal 
directly to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, not a trial de novo in district court as 
for judicial review of informal administrative proceedings. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-
4-403. 
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permitted to intervene, a person must have standing and must also be aggrieved." (See 
TWWBrief,atl8). 
Likewise, TWW has failed to establish a nexus between the "party" requirement 
of Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401 necessary for a petitioner to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on a district court, and the requirements for intervention under Rule 24 once 
such a proper action has been commenced. Section 63G-4-401 simply confers no "party" 
requirement on intervenors in addition to the requirements to intervene under Rule 24. 
In sum, intervenors such as Roy City need not establish "standing" independent of 
Rule 24 to intervene in a district court's judicial review of a State Engineer decision 
because all proceedings in the judicial review are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which allows intervention under Rule 24. Neither case law nor Utah statutes 
impose a "party" requirement on intervenors in addition to the requirements of Rule 24. 
2. INTERVENTION IS NOT PROHIBITED IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
STATE ENGINEER DECISIONS. 
Notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous application of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, including Rule 24, to "all additional pleadings and proceedings" in the action 
below for judicial review, see UTAH CODE ANN § 63G-4-402(2), TWW argues that 
"intervention is specifically prohibited in the judicial review of an order of the State 
Engineer . . ." (See TWW Brief, at 20.) TWW reasons that because Utah Admin. Code 
Questar is also inapposite to the case at bar on factual grounds. Questar involved 
a formal adjudicative proceeding in which the petition for judicial review commenced an 
appellate review by the supreme court, not a trial de novo in district court governed by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, Roy City is not the party seeking 
judicial review by filing a petition for judicial review, as were the consumers in Questar. 
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R655-6-3.A defines "adjudicative proceeding" to include judicial review, and Rule R655-
6-8 and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-203(g) prohibit intervention in informal adjudicative 
proceedings, Roy City's intervention in the judicial review of the State Engineer's order 
is prohibited. (See TWW Brief, at 23.) Such analysis ignores the clear mandate in 
section 63G-4-402(2) of UAPA that all judicial review proceedings in the district court 
be governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, which permit intervention under Rule 24. 
A proper analysis of this issue requires adherence to established rules of statutory 
construction. "In examining sections of the Utah Code, we are guided by the principle 
that the provisions of a statute must be interpreted in light of the statute as a whole, not in 
a piecemeal fashion." Utah Bankers Ass'n v. America First Credit Union, 912 P.2d 988, 
993 (Utah 1996). "[0]ne of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the 
court will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire 
context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject." Mountain States Tel 
& Tel Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (quotation omitted). When read in 
context with the other statutes in UAPA, it is clear that section 402's prohibition against 
intervention only applies to informal proceedings before the administrative agency, not to 
judicial review of such proceedings. 
First, extending the prohibition against intervention in administrative proceedings 
before the State Engineer to proceedings for judicial review would render meaningless 
section 63G-4-402(2)(b), which provides that "air additional proceedings after the 
petition are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. "When analyzing statutory 
language, we presume that the Legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to 
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each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Eastern Utah Broad, v. 
Labor Comm % 2007 UT App 99, lf8, 158 P.3d 1115 (quotations omitted). "Our mles of 
statutory construction dictate that we interpret the statute so that each word has meaning." 
Id. 
Second, prohibiting intervention in judicial review would also subvert the plain 
and unambiguous meaning of the recent amendments to Utah Code Ann. section 73-3-14, 
which require that a person who files a petition for judicial review of a State Engineer 
order give written notice "to each person who filed a protest. . . of (b) the opportunity to 
intervene in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24." See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 73-3-14(3)(b)(ii). Such amendment evinces a clear legislative recognition that 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies to proceedings for judicial review, 
and that protestants must now be given notice of that opportunity to intervene rather than 
be joined in the action initially.6 
Third, in addition to prohibiting intervention, section 63G-4-203(l) also prohibits 
discovery, which is clearly not the intent in a trial de novo expressly made subject to the 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Discovery is allowed and routinely conducted in all lawsuits 
for judicial review of State Engineer Decisions by the district court. Extending the 
TWW argues that the amendment to section 73-3-14 "implied that late protestants 
are not included in the group of potential intervenors in the action." (TWW Brief, at 24.) 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected this same argument in In re EM., 2006 UT 36, 137 
P.3d 809, in the adoption context. In that case, Utah Code section 78-30-4.13(11) 
granted a right to intervene in an adoption proceeding on persons who were entitled to 
notice of the adoption proceeding. Id. ^53. The Court held: "We do not read section 78-
30-4.13(11) as restricting those who may be eligible to intervene in the adoption and 
present relevant best evidence to persons entitled to notice." Id. ^ |55. 
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prohibition against intervention to judicial review would require extension of the 
prohibition against discovery to judicial review as well.7 
Finally, it is implicit in the context of section 63G-4-203 that all of the procedures, 
requirements, and limitations set forth therein apply only to proceedings before the 
administrative agency, not a judicial review, because they relate to: 
filing responsive pleadings to a "notice of agency action" or "request for 
agency action" 
the agency's obligations to hold a hearing, 
procedures for conducting any such agency hearing, 
provision that the "agency may issue subpoenas" 
"access to information contained in the agency's files," 
issuance of a signed order by the agency's "presiding officer," 
recording of any hearing by the agency, 
preparation of transcript of "agency's record of the hearing," and 
investigative rights of the agency. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-203 (1953). 
When read as a whole and in context, it is clear that UAPA does not prohibit 
intervention on judicial review. Rather, the prohibition against intervention applies only 
to administrative proceedings before the administrative agency. Because UAPA provides 
that all additional proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Roy City's intervention is governed solely by Rule 24. 
7
 TWW acknowledges that discovery is permitted in a proceeding for judicial 
review. {See TWW Brief, at 34 (arguing that Roy City's intervention "would certainly 
require a substantially longer period of time for discovery").) 
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3, EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT REQUIRED 
FOR RULE 24 INTERVENTION. 
A. The Participation Requirement is not Applicable to Rule 24 Intervenors. 
TWW and the State Engineer also erroneously contend that Roy City "seeks to 
circumvent the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies by intervening in the 
judicial review." {See TWW Brief, at 26; see also State Engineer Brief, at 13-14.) 
TWW misapprehends the application of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine and its 
corollary participation requirement, which only apply to a party seeking judicial review, 
not intervention. The requirement of participation is "a prerequisite to standing to 
appeal'" not a prerequisite to intervention. See S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 
1087 (emphasis added) (holding that non-participant at administrative proceeding did not 
have right to appeal the State Engineer's order to the district court for judicial review). 
Roy City is not seeking judicial review and is not required to establish that it has 
"standing to appeal" (i.e. standing to seek judicial review). Therefore, Roy City need not 
establish its compliance with this participation requirement. 
B. Roy City Participated in the Administrative Proceeding Before the State 
Engineer. 
In any event, Roy City fully complied with the applicable participation 
requirement, which requires that "a party seeking review of agency action must raise an 
issue before that agency to preserve the issue for further review." See Badger v. 
o 
Although the court in Morgan referred to it as "standing to appeal"" the 
participation requirement as applied was a prerequisite to standing to seek judicial review 
of a final agency action in informal adjudicative proceedings, not the standing to appeal a 
final agency action in formal adjudicative proceedings or from a trial court to an appellate 
court. 
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Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). Although Roy City is not the party 
seeking review of the State Engineer's Order, Roy City nevertheless raised its concerns 
before the State Engineer nineteen months before the State Engineer issued his Order (R. 
121-23, 182-85). Roy City's protest not only presented the "possibility that it could be 
considered," Badger, 966 P.2d at 847, but actually was considered and addressed by both 
the State Engineer (R. 182-85) and TWW (R. 172-176). By its protest, Roy City 
"[brought] to the agency's attention all relevant facts and considerations at the time the 
agency [made] its decision" and "[gave] the agency and the other participants notice of 
the identity and concern of interested parties." Morgan, 797 P.2d at 1087 (quoting 
Colorado Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958, 962 
(Colo. 1982)). 
TWW urges this Court to follow Texas in City of Port Arthur v. Southwestern Bell 
Tel. Co., 13 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) in support of its contention that Roy City 
should be prohibited from intervening in the judicial review because of its failure to 
participate as a party in the administrative proceeding. {See TWW Brief, at 29-30.) Port 
Arthur is inapposite to the immediate case and can be distinguished on two grounds. 
First, the intervenor in Port Arthur had no substantive participation in the administrative 
proceeding other than a procedural motion to intervene, whereas Roy City did in fact 
participate in the administrative proceeding and its substantive concerns were presented 
to and considered by the State Engineer. Second, the Port Arthur court noted that the 
intervenor "cites this Court to no authority entitling one to intervene in a district court 
suit for judicial review of an agency's decision concerning an administrative proceeding 
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to which it was not a party," id. at 844, but none of the Texas Administrative Procedures 
Act, Public Utility Regulation Act, or the Texas Administrative Code require or provide 
that the proceedings for judicial review in Texas be governed by the rules of civil 
procedure, as does Utah Code Ann. section 63G-4-402(2)(a),(b). 
In summary, Roy City was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies by 
participating in the administrative proceeding because Roy City is not seeking judicial 
review, and TWW has pointed to no case requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies 
for potential intervenors. In any event, even if required, Roy City did exhaust its 
administrative remedies by participating (albeit in a limited fashion) in the proceeding 
below, presenting its concerns and the nature of its interests to the State Engineer, and 
having those concerns considered and addressed by both TWW and the State Engineer in 
the administrative proceeding. 
4. ROY CITY'S INTERVENTION IS TIMELY AND WILL NOT PREJUDICE 
TWW. 
As a final point of contention, TWW argues that Roy City's intervention in 
this matter does not comply with the requirements of Rule 24 because intervention now 
(1) is untimely and (2) will prejudice TWW. {See TWW Brief, at 31-35.) 
A. Roy City's Intervention is Timely. 
TWW argues that if Rule 24 does govern in this case, Roy City's Motion to 
Intervene is "untimely" because "the district court is a reviewing court" akin to an 
appellate court, "a decision was already entered by the State Engineer in the proceedings 
below," and post-judgment intervention for the first time on appeal is only pennitted 
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"upon a strong showing of entitlement and justification/'9 (See TWW Brief, 31-32.) 
Such characterizations of the nature of the action for judicial review are in direct conflict 
with UAPA, which expressly states that the "district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo" the final agency action. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-
402(l)(a). As stated by this Court, when interpreting section 63G-4-402(l)(a) (formerly 
63-46b-15(l)(a)): 
This section requires that the district court's review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings be performed by holding a new trial rather than 
by reviewing the informal record. 
[PJursuant to section [63G-4-402(l)(a)]? review by trial de novo means a 
new trial with no deference to the administrative proceedings below. 
Archer v. Bd of State Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Utah 1995). TWW even 
recognizes and concedes that the action before the district court is a "trial de novo of the 
May 10, 2007 Order of the State Engineer." (See Complaint *[fl, 7.) Given that the action 
for judicial review is a trial de novo, Roy City's intervention does not come "on appeal" 
and is not brought for the first time "post-judgment." Accordingly, Roy City's Motion to 
Intervene, filed in the early stages of the de novo judicial review proceeding, is timely. 
B. TWW will not be Prejudiced by Roy City's Intervention. 
TWW also mistakenly argues that "the only issue that appears to be contested by 
the proper parties is the permissibility of that portion of the State Engineer's Order that 
limits his approval to a term of ten years," (TWW Brief, at 34), and that TWW will be 
9
 TWW's reliance on Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), is misplaced. In Envirotech, the Court of Appeals rejected a request to intervene 
in the appeal of a trial court's decision, stating that Rule 24 "contemplates timely 
intervention at the trial court and not for the first time on appeal." Id. at 501. 
4850-1386-8803/RO042-003 20 
prejudiced by Roy City's intervention because the City now asks the district court to 
allow it to contest additional matters and litigate issues already resolved by the State 
Engineer, (see id.). 
However, as recognized by this Court, judicial review requires a trial de novo "on 
all issues which could have been raised under the application to the State Engineer."1 
East Bench Irr. Co. v. Utah, 300 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1956) (emphasis added). Thus, 
"there are issues in every appeal from the engineer's decision which must be adjudicated. 
The court must adjudicate whether there is reason to believe that some rights may be 
acquired under such application without impairing the vested rights of others." Id. at 607 
(emphasis added). "[T]he 'trial de novo' specified in the statute comprehends a trial of 
all pertinent issues to detennine whether the applicant has met his burden of showing that 
the necessary conditions exist to warrant approval of his application." Shields v. Dry 
Creek Irr. Co., 363 P.2d 82, 84 (Utah 1961) (emphasis added). TWW, by petitioning this 
Court for judicial review by trial de novo, has opened the door for consideration of "all 
pertinent issues" that were raised before the State Engineer, and cannot now self-
servingly close the door on those issues it does not want to be reviewed. 
Finally, TWW asserts that Roy City's intervention in the judicial review would 
prejudice TWW because of the statutory two-year time constraint imposed by Utah Code 
Section 73-3-8(1) of the Utah Code sets forth five criteria that must be satisfied 
before an application to appropriate can be approved. Two of these requirements include 
whether "there is unappropriated water in the proposed source" and "the proposed use 
will not impair existing rights or interfere with the more beneficial use of the water." 
U.C.A. § 73-3-8(l)(a)(i),(ii). 
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Ann. section 73-3-15 and Roy City's intervention "would certainly require a substantially 
longer period of time for discovery, briefing and argument^]"11 (TWW Brief, at 32-33, 
34.) Under this reasoning, intervention by nearly every protestant notified pursuant to 
amended Utah Code Ann. section 73-3- 14(3)(b)(ii) of the opportunity to intervene would 
prejudice the party who petitions for judicial review of State Engineer decisions. Roy 
City's Motion to Intervene simply will not operate any prejudice to TWW. 
5. THE STATE ENGINEER'S CONCERNS SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND DO NOT 
REQUIRE DENIAL OF ROY CITY'S INTERVENTION. 
A. The State Engineer Failed to Raise His Policy Issues Below 
The thrust of the State Engineer's argument, expressed for the very first time in its 
brief on appeal, is that policy dictates that allowing a non-party to the administrative 
proceeding, such as Roy City, to intervene will allow anyone to avoid the administrative 
process and to raise any "issue they find newly convenient," which "denigrates the 
agency process," {see Brief of Appellee Utah State Engineer Brief, at 14, ("State 
Engineer Brief')), and ueviscerate[s] the State Engineer's role as water administrator," 
(id. at 17.) 
It is well established that Utah's appellate courts "will not consider for the first 
time on appeal issues that were not raised below." See Doug Jessop Const., Inc. v. 
Anderton, 2008 UT App 348, Ifll, 195 P.3d 493. The State Engineer did not file a 
11
 This Court also recently cast a heavy shadow of doubt on the constitutionality of 
section 73-3-15 in Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, f!9, 184 P.3d 578, pointing 
out serious concerns that Ihe statute's "strict deadline for mandatory dismissal raise[s] 
due process and separation of powers issues." 
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memorandum in opposition to Roy City's Motion to Intervene or raise any of his policy 
issues at oral argument in the district court proceeding below. Thus, his new arguments 
should be disregarded. 
B. The State Engineer's Policy Concerns are no more than a Postulated 
Parade of Horribles 
Even considering the State Engineer's newly-raised policy considerations, it 
becomes apparent that he conveniently ignores important facts that distinguish Roy 
City's intervention from his postulated uparade of horribles." ~ First, as an intervenor, 
Roy City may not (nor does it seek to) raise new issues not raised in the administrative 
proceeding. Utah law is clear: all parties on de novo review are limited to only those 
issues raised to a "level of consciousness" below. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 
966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
Furthermore, intervention by Roy City does not render less certain the State 
Engineer's decision-making process. Any uncertainty in his administrative decision was 
created by TWW's petition for judicial review in district court, a review that is allowed 
and proper in all respects. 
It should also be noted that the State Engineer's policy arguments are not 
supported by any relevant, factual basis. "'When interpreting a statute, we look first to its 
plain language.' 'Only if we find some ambiguity [in the statute's plain language] need 
we look further, and only then need we seek guidance from the legislative history and 
relevant policy considerations.'" Mecham v. Frazier, 2008 UT 60, [^10, 193 P.3d 630, 
632 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). UAPA is clear and unambiguous: after a 
party petitions judicial review by filing a "complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure," Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(2)(a), "[a]ll additional pleadings and 
proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," id. § 
63G-4-402(2)(b). 
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Rule 24 does not fling open the door of intervention to anyone and everyone, but 
rather protects the State Engineer and the administrative process under the current legal 
framework governing Rule 24.13 Only third-parties, such as Roy City, who meet Rule 
24's requirements may intervene in the already initiated de novo review, and such 
intervenors are limited to the issues raised below. Contrary to the State Engineer's 
assertions, these requirements ensure that not "all non-party participants [may] intervene 
on de novo review," (State Engineer Brief, at 18), and ensures that the restraints are not 
discarded, "allowing unlimited access to the de novo review, " (id. at 19).14 The State 
Engineer also ignores the public policy furthered by the clear and controlling statutory 
and case law allowing third parties to intervene injudicial review of the State Engineer's 
decision if and only if they meet the requirements of Rule 24. 
Finally, allowing Roy City to intervene in the judicial review below will not allow 
a late-protestant to bootstrap itself to "the rights and privileges of a party who complies 
with applicable statutory mandates." (See id.) Roy City, as a late protestant, may not and 
13
 For example, under Rule 24(a) a third-party may intervene as of right only if it 
meets four requirements: (1) the application for intervention is timely; (2) the proposed 
intervenor has an interest in the subject matter of the action; (3) the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the proposed intervenor's ability to 
protect that interest; and (4) that interest is inadequately represented by existing parties. 
See Beacham v. Fritzi Realty Corp., 2006 UT App 35, f7, 131 P.3d 271 (quoting UTAH 
R. CIV. P. 24(a)); see also Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101, 1108 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
14
 For example, although any person "interested" may file a protest on an application 
before the State Engineer, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-20, the standard required for 
intervention under Rule 24 is higher. Such requisite "interest" for intervention has been 
described as being one that will be directly affected by the outcome of the litigation. No 
such requirement is imposed to be an "interested" party to file a protest with the State 
Engineer in the administrative proceeding. 
4850-1386-8803/RO042-003 24 
did not itself petition and obtain judicial review, but once a party such as TWW opened 
the door, the door is opened de novo as to all issues that the State Engineer considered (or 
should have considered) in approving or rejecting an application, and all persons who 
may be aggrieved by the court's disposition of those issues. This allows the court to 
examine anew the issues decided by the State Engineer with the benefit of input from all 
who may be aggrieved by the ruling. 
While the State Engineer recites a litany of bleak and grim consequences if this 
Court allows Roy City to intervene in the judicial review, {see State Engineer Brief, at 
13-15, 16), these consequences and concerns are more imagined than real. No additional 
actions for judicial review of State Engineer decisions will be fostered as only parties to 
the administrative proceeding having the appropriate standing to seek judicial review 
may initiate judicial review. The "parade of horribles" imagined by the State Engineer 
simply does not exist, nor will it be fostered by allowing all aggrieved parties to intervene 
and participate in proceedings already initiated. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying Roy City's Motion to Intervene because Roy City 
is not required to establish its own standing beyond meeting the requirements of Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern all proceedings in a judicial review of 
State Engineer decisions. The State Engineer's concerns, raised for the first time on 
appeal, do not justify departure from the plain and controlling statutes governing Roy 
City's "standing" to intervene under Rule 24. 
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